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Abstract
We investigate the life span and risk of termination of 723 arm’s length agencies in the United 
Kingdom between 1985 and 2008, an under investigated question in parliamentary systems. We 
hypothesize that termination risk depends on three groups of factors: (1) factors relating to the 
rationales for initial delegation of responsibility to the arm’s length agency; (2) factors relating to 
the political and economic position of the government; and (3) factors relating to the institutional 
form of the agency. We find that agencies intended to generate credible commitments in regula-
tion are less likely than others to be terminated in any given year. Agencies operating under right-
wing governments and under heavily indebted governments are more likely to be terminated, 
although left-wing governments are more sensitive to the effects of debt. Agencies structured as 
executive non-departmental public bodies and non-ministerial departments are also longer lived 
than others. Contrary to expectations about arm’s length agencies in parliamentary systems with 
single-party government, partisan change does not affect the risk of termination.
Introduction
From the perspective of the regulatory state, the lon-
gevity of arm’s length agencies is a strength. Long-lived 
independent regulatory agencies help reassure inves-
tors about the future regulatory environment, allowing 
investment decisions to be made efficiently. If agencies 
can be abolished easily, however, then the “credible 
commitment” problem is simply “relocated” rather 
than solved (McCallum 1995; Perino 2010). Politicians 
have also delegated power to arm’s length agencies to 
solve other credibility problems in the political sphere 
relating to probity (how rigorous is the administration 
of politicians’ expenses?) and technical expertise (how 
dangerous are illegal drugs?), but again the credibility 
generated by such delegation may be damaged if agen-
cies are easily abolished.
Politicians do in fact retain and use the power to 
abolish agencies. This is understandable: since agencies 
are neither unbiased nor infallible, politicians wish to 
monitor agency performance and to constrain bureau-
cratic drift (Boin and Goodin 2007). As priorities 
change over time, politicians will want to ensure that 
the bureaucracy is reorganized to best deliver new 
programs. Terminating (or retaining) an arm’s length 
agency thus involves a trade-off between the value of 
political control and the value of a reputation for sta-
ble and credible governance.
This article models the life spans of arm’s length 
agencies in the United Kingdom, testing the hypoth-
esis that agencies set up to deliver credible commit-
ments will last longer as a result of this trade-off. We 
also test whether agency survival is related to political 
and economic factors. We test these hypotheses using 
data on British agencies spanning a 23-year period 
(1985–2008).
We begin by discussing the literature on agency ter-
mination in the United States and Europe, and argue 
that the literature has failed to test hypotheses regard-
ing agency termination in parliamentary systems. We 
then describe a number of rationales for delegation, 
 Data and code for replication are available from the authors and in 
the process of being archived with the ESRC data archive. Address 
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and hypotheses derived from these rationales and from 
the broader literature. Section 3 then provides back-
ground information on the position of agencies in 
the British political system, together with illustrative 
examples of agency creation and termination. These 
cases also demonstrate the distinction between policy 
and agency termination. In Section 4 we explicitly 
defend our understanding of termination, before dis-
cussing, in Section 5, our data and our modeling strat-
egy. Section 6 presents and discusses our results and 
Section 7 concludes.
Existing Work
Research on Agency Termination in Presidential and 
Parliamentary Systems
Since the early contributions of Kaufman (1976) and 
DeLeon (1978) a body of work has developed in the 
United States and Europe on agency and policy ter-
mination. Simplifying greatly, there are two broad 
research agendas concerning agency termination. 
A  first research agenda uses inferential statistics on 
data from the United States to test hypotheses concern-
ing the factors leading to agency termination (Boin, 
Kuipers, and Steenbergen 2010; Carpenter 2000; 
Carpenter and Lewis 2004; Lewis 2002, 2004; Meier 
1980; Peters and Hogwood 1988). This literature has 
argued that party political factors—specifically the 
formation of an “unfriendly majority”—increase the 
risk that an agency will be terminated. Other features 
such as statutory protection and economic conditions 
are also considered. Though some research has moved 
on to discuss policy termination (Berry, Burden, and 
Howell 2010; Corder 2004), we argue below that in 
the UK context agency termination is distinct from 
policy termination.
A second research agenda uses descriptive statis-
tics on data from across Europe to describe agency 
termination as part of a broader process of organiza-
tional change within the state (MacCarthaigh 2012; 
Nakrošis and Budraitis 2012; Rolland and Roness 
2012; Sarapuu 2012). This literature, with some 
exceptions (Hajnal 2012), has proposed but not tested 
hypotheses concerning factors which matter for agency 
termination.
These two research agendas deal with presiden-
tial and parliamentary systems respectively. The find-
ings of the first research agenda, based on the study 
of presidential systems, have dramatic implications 
for agency termination in parliamentary systems. 
The key difference between presidential and par-
liamentary systems is the absence in the latter of a 
separate institutional veto player (the presidency) 
(Tsebelis 2002). Additionally, most parliamentary sys-
tems are characterized by monocameralism or weak 
bicameralism, further reducing the number of insti-
tutional veto   players. Some have argued that multi-
ple partisan veto players are functional equivalents 
of institutional veto players (cf., Crepaz and Moser 
2004; Tsebelis 1995). However, since in at least some 
parliamentary systems (the so-called Westminster 
democracies) government is characterized by alterna-
tion between two large cohesive parties, it seems that 
the risk of an “unfriendly majority” emerging is high, 
and thus that the expected duration of agencies given 
alternation in government is low.
Thus, if the factors which affect agency termina-
tion in the United States were also to affect agency 
termination in parliamentary systems, particularly 
those characterized by single-party government, then 
delegation to arm’s length agencies would provide 
little additional credibility to government commit-
ments to regulatory behavior, disinterested decision 
making and policy making informed by expert advice. 
Credibility cannot be generated in this system unless 
there is some constraint on agency abolition other 
than legislative veto players. To make this case, we 
must first unpack the notions of the arm’s length 
agency, and the different rationales for initial delega-
tion to agencies.
Arm’s Length Agencies and Rationales for 
Delegation
By arm’s length agency, we mean an agency which per-
forms some public function; which is intended to per-
form this function in a manner that is institutionally at 
arm’s length from ministerial direction; and which is 
staffed publicly (Talbot 2004, 5). There is a presump-
tion that these agencies will carry out their objectives 
with a degree of autonomy and independence such 
that the government can credibly claim to have com-
mitted to a particular course of action, with limited 
scope for ex post adjustment by politicians. This makes 
our agencies distinct from some which are pure “deliv-
ery agencies,” known as executive agencies in the UK 
context.
The agencies we study are established under different 
rationales. Rationales are publicly justifiable reasons for 
delegating.1 As Elgie and McMenamin (2005) show in 
their analysis of French agencies the rationale for del-
egation affects the degree of independence agencies are 
given. Here, we argue that the rationale also affects the 
likelihood of agency termination and consider four differ-
ent rationales: agencies set up to generate commitments 
in regulation, commitments to decision making char-
acterized by probity, and to decision making informed 
1 Rationales are different from explanations, which are often not publicly 
justifiable. Common explanations are effort reduction, blame shifting, 
or client politics: Bertelli 2012, 84–8; Fox and Jordan 2011; Hood 2002.
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by expertise. The fourth rationale for an agency is to 
provide a platform for the representation of citizen and 
user groups in public policy and administration. This 
last group differs in that it does not necessarily involve 
any delegation of authority.
Our first rationale, regulation, is the most promi-
nent in the literature on independent agencies in 
Europe (Gilardi 2002; Majone 1997), particularly 
but not exclusively economic regulation. Because 
governments are sovereign they have difficulty com-
mitting to particular policies and, in theory, can 
change direction when circumstances make such 
change favorable. The problem is particularly severe 
in Westminster systems with their combination of 
parliamentary sovereignty and a tendency toward 
single-party majorities (Moe and Caldwell 1994). 
Thanks to politicians’ time-inconsistent preferences 
(Kydland and Prescott 1977), investors will be more 
cautious in their decisions if no institutional mecha-
nisms exist to constrain policy change (Levy and 
Spiller 1995; North and Weingast 1989). Delegation 
to an agency that does not share the government’s 
incentive to adjust the regulatory framework ex 
post (Gilardi 2002) can address this.2 In the United 
Kingdom the utilities regulators—the Office of Gas 
and Electricity Markets (Ofgem), the Water Services 
Regulation Authority (Ofwat), and the Office of 
Communications (Ofcom)—are good examples of 
delegation to generate commitment in economic 
regulation. Though the challenge of commitment is 
particularly stark in economic regulation (Bertelli 
and Whitfield 2009), similar dynamics exist wherever 
governments use arm’s length agencies to establish 
credible regulatory commitments to the rules under 
which some public or private activity occurs.
Our second rationale, probity, is used when politi-
cians wish to signal that the output of an agency is 
“fair” and has not been influenced by partisan bias or 
a politician’s self-interest. In the United Kingdom, the 
Arts Council for England is an example of an agency 
created under this kind of rationale: grant giving is 
formally at arm’s length from politicians. Probity dif-
fers from regulation in that agency independence is 
not designed to ensure commitment across time, but 
rather the credibility of a particular kind of decision 
making. A hard institutional separation between the 
political design of the grant program and its imple-
mentation by an arm’s length agency emphasizes 
this.3
Our third rationale concerns expertise. Where poli-
ticians are inadequately informed about the techni-
calities of a policy problem, governments sometimes 
delegate the responsibility to provide evidence or pol-
icy recommendations to an agency. Although decisions 
may still be taken by elected ministers, the existence 
of an expert arm’s length agency provides some assur-
ance about the quality of the information and analysis 
on which decisions are based, and where the advice is 
public it adds to the transparency of the policy process.
The first three rationales for delegation are all, to 
some extent, about depoliticizing (Burnham 2001) 
aspects of policy development or implementation, and/
or removing some source of temptation from elected 
ministers. The fourth rationale for delegating concerns 
representation. In our data there are many agencies 
charged with representing interest groups in the policy 
process. Consumer or user councils established to mon-
itor particular markets are some examples. These agen-
cies act as a check on the bureaucracy, either directly 
or by sounding fire alarms to warn political principals 
about agency drift (Holburn and Vanden Bergh 2006; 
McCubbins and Schwartz 1984).
Hypotheses
Having clarified these four rationales for delegation, 
we now formulate hypotheses in terms of these ration-
ales and add further hypotheses commonly found in 
the literature.
Hypotheses Based on Rationale
Governments benefit if they can convince external 
audiences that they keep their promises, act with pro-
bity, and listen to expertise. Delegating to an arm’s 
length agency can help a government make the case 
for its credibility on these dimensions to relevant 
audiences. However, governments sometimes wish to 
engage in ex post adjustment of delegation. In some 
instances, this can be achieved by adjusting some of 
the details of the delegation and this approach may 
attract little attention. In other instances, however, 
the gap between government preference and the 
existing agency is such that more extensive reform is 
called for. There is a good chance that terminating 
an agency will be interpreted by external audiences 
as the government either seeking to reverse previous 
commitments in certain regulatory fields, or prioritiz-
ing particularistic aims over probity in decision mak-
ing, or limiting the role of evidence in public policy 
making This reputational damage will result in for-
gone benefits for the government.
Given these forgone benefits, we hypothesize that:
 H1a. Agencies whose rationale is to provide cred-
ibility in regulation, probity, or expertise will live 
2 Agency preferences are additionally assumed to be stable over time 
and independent of investors’ actions.
3 See, Flinders (2008, 236)  on public distrust in politicians as a reason 
for delegation. Political impartiality was one of the tests applied in the 
recent review of public bodies (Public Administration Select Committee 
2011, 7).
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longer than agencies which have representation as 
their rationale
 H1b. Agencies whose rationale is to provide cred-
ibility in regulation will live longer than agencies 
with other rationales
Given our emphasis on the initial rationales for delega-
tion, and given that these initial rationales are known to 
affect the structure of agencies (Elgie and McMenamin 
2005; Gilardi 2002, 2005), it is important to recognize 
that agency structure may also pose barriers to termi-
nation. Our dataset includes five types of agency, as 
discussed in the next section. Broadly, these differences 
in type match differences in staffing and expenditure: 
agencies labeled “executive non-departmental public 
bodies,” “non-ministerial departments,” or “public 
corporations” are in general more substantial and con-
sequently more costly to abolish than the others in our 
dataset.4 We postpone discussion of the full array of 
agency types to the next section, and for the moment 
limit ourselves to the hypothesis that:
 H2. Agencies which are non-ministerial depart-
ments (NMDs), executive non-departmental public 
bodies (NDPBs), or public corporations will have a 
lower likelihood of termination than all other agencies
Hypotheses Based on Party Politics
Agency termination is closely related to party politics in 
the US research (e.g., Lewis 2003). This is true also for 
agency termination in parliamentary systems. Rolland 
and Roness (2012, 785–87) link changes in the rates 
of agency formation and termination to seven differ-
ent periods in Norwegian party government. Nakrošis 
and Budraitis (2012, 829)  find that wholesale coali-
tion turnover is associated with greater organizational 
change (including termination) than partial coalition 
turnover.
The quantitative analyses of partisan politics and 
agency termination have assumed that parties’ posi-
tions along a spatial dimension structure the creation 
and termination of agencies, in two ways (Lewis 2002, 
2004). First, insofar as parties on the right wish to 
demonstrate that they prefer a smaller state, and inso-
far as arm’s length agencies are primarily funded by 
the state and are important as political symbols of an 
expansive state, we might expect an effect of politi-
cal orientation. Note that we do not assume that abol-
ishing agencies is always an effective way of cutting 
government expenditure or activity, for example, by 
terminating policies. Agency abolition has often been 
used as a political strategy for signaling a right leaning 
government’s cost cutting credentials to its supporters 
and the electorate.5 Specifically, we hypothesize that,
 H3a. The risk of agency termination will be 
greater under right-wing governments than under 
left-wing governments
Second, insofar as agencies reflect the political prefer-
ences of the governments that established them, there 
are good reasons for political turnover to result in 
higher rates of agency termination. If governments 
“stack the deck” (McCubbins, Noll and Weingast 
1987) when creating new agencies, then since incom-
ing governments dislike policies enacted at positions 
far from their own, the incentive to shut down (and 
optionally reestablish) a regulator created by an 
opposing and ideologically distant coalition is greater. 
Consequently, we hypothesize that:
 H3b. The greater the policy distance between the 
current government and the government which 
established the agency, the greater the risk of agency 
termination
Hypotheses Based on the Economic Environment
The total resources available to support agencies are 
very loosely constrained by the government’s fiscal 
position. Though “the termination of agencies osten-
sibly to improve economy and efficiency [often] ... has 
political overtones” (Lewis 2002, 91), high govern-
ment deficits may make it easier, or necessary, for gov-
ernments of different ideological positions to cut down 
on the size of the state. This effect is ambiguous: while 
higher debt may imply greater urgency in cutting the 
bureaucracy (or being seen to cut the bureaucracy—see 
discussion around H3a) and thus imply higher risk of 
agency termination, it may also make the short-term 
costs of agency termination too high. Nevertheless, we 
hypothesize that:
 H4a. The higher the level of government debt as 
a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the 
higher the risk of agency termination
However, the effect of debt varies according to the 
political complexion of government. Persson and 
Svensson (1989) have argued that right-wing parties 
are more sanguine about increasing government debt, 
as it limits the options for left-wing parties to engage 
in high spending. A  version of this argument argues 
that right-wing parties intentionally cut taxes without 
identifying corresponding expenditure savings in order 
4 We were unable to find reliable and comprehensive data on costs and 
staffing over the period of study.
5 That agency termination may be important both symbolically and 
in genuine cost terms, supports the encompassing definition of 
termination, discussed below.
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to “starve the beast.” Irrespective of the source of the 
deficit, we argue that:
 H4b. The effect of government debt on agency ter-
mination is larger under left-wing governments than 
under right-wing governments
These hypotheses concerning the initial rationale for 
delegation, the structure of the agency, the effects of 
political turnover and political orientation in govern-
ment, and the effects of the government’s fiscal posi-
tion are applicable across parliamentary systems. In 
the next section, we discuss particular features of the 
British context, the link between our hypotheses and 
the British experience and provide three illustrative 
case studies of agency birth and termination.
Arm’s Length Agencies in Great Britain
In Britain the key bureaucratic structure has tradition-
ally been the ministerial department, led by an elected 
politician drawn from the cabinet. This structure is 
linked to the constitutional convention of ministers 
being responsible (or at least accountable) to Parliament 
for the actions undertaken by the departments they 
head. Alongside these core structures, however, there 
has long been a diverse group of organizations, out-
side the classic chain of ministerial accountability and 
acting on authority delegated to them ultimately from 
Parliament. The justification given for these arm’s 
length agencies is that departments led by ministers 
have difficulty generating the types of credibility we 
discussed earlier, though the development of this British 
system of delegated governance has often been ad hoc 
and unsystematic (Flinders and McConnel 1999). We 
focus on three categories of agency: NMDs, public cor-
porations, and NDPBs (Cabinet Office 2011). The last 
of these has three subcategories. This is not the whole 
universe of public organizations. Other bodies such 
as “executive agencies” and National Health Service 
bodies are focused on efficient task completion rather 
than establishing a level of independence from political 
control. We also exclude Scottish, Welsh, and Northern 
Irish agencies, the organization of which was affected 
by devolution, and which for much of our period oper-
ated under distinct political systems. A  comparative 
account of various agency structures can be found 
in Verhoest et  al. (2012). The chapter on the United 
Kingdom in that volume focuses on executive agencies, 
one of the types of organization we exclude (James 
et al. 2012).
Non-Ministerial Departments
NMDs are government departments, staffed by civil 
servants, established by legislation but headed by a 
statutory board, or a Director-General, rather than 
their own elected minister. This structure is intended to 
protect NMDs from political direction by the incum-
bent government. Each has a sponsoring department 
through which it is accountable to Parliament. Many 
economic regulators are NMDs (e.g., the sector regu-
lators mentioned earlier), as are some noneconomic 
regulators.
The Food Standards Agency (FSA) illustrates some 
of the complexities of the politics around agency ration-
ale. The FSA, a regulatory agency, was established in 
2000 in response to a decade of food scares, starting 
with salmonella-infected hens’ eggs in the late 1980s 
and continuing with scares about Escherichia coli and 
bovine spongiform encephalopathy in the 1990s. In 
the words of an official review of food safety policy 
at the time, the catalog of food scares that “faced the 
British public in the last ten years has eroded – some 
would say destroyed – confidence in the current sys-
tem” (James 1997, Part 1, sec. 4). The decline in public 
confidence in food regulation was also a threat to agri-
cultural interests through diminished demand for pro-
duce and through the overreactions of politicians to 
food scares. The establishment of the FSA was aimed 
at rebuilding public confidence and it has also been 
interpreted as a response to the interests of major food 
retailers, who have a stake in a credible quality assur-
ance system (Wales, Harvey, and Warde 2006).
The weaknesses of the previous system were 
diagnosed as a lack of political independence from 
Government and a conflict of interest in the politi-
cian-led Ministry of Agriculture, Farms and Fisheries 
(MAFF) which was responsible for both promot-
ing agricultural interests and ensuring food safety. 
The Labour party was able to portray the incumbent 
Conservative government as favoring special interests 
over consumer safety and in the run up to the 1997 
election Tony Blair, then leader of the opposition, 
called for “… a proper, independent food standards 
agency that can look into these matters and monitor 
them on behalf of the public.”6
After winning the 1997 general election the Labour 
government set about establishing the FSA as well as 
moving its sponsorship from MAFF to the Department 
of Health. Legislation was passed in 1999. In addition 
to food safety the FSA was also given responsibility for 
authentication and food labeling.
Early in its period of operation the FSA demon-
strated its independence by failing to support ministe-
rial claims about the health benefits of organic food. It 
also disappointed campaigners by declining to support 
campaigners’ claims about the adverse effects of genet-
ically modified foods (Flynn et  al. 2004). At the end 
of the period covered by our research (2008) the FSA 
6 Hansard, HC Deb March 11, 1997 vol. 292 cc 136–42.
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had survived and was largely unreformed. However, 
press reports after the 2010 election suggested that the 
new Conservative-Liberal Democrat government was 
considering abolishing the agency (Ramesh 2010). The 
FSA survived but was significantly reformed, losing 
responsibility for food labeling (where it had advo-
cated against retailers’ interests) and authenticity, both 
functions being returned to minster-led departments. 
The Agency retained responsibility for food safety.
These changes demonstrate that reforms short of 
abolition can be important but also that the govern-
ment backed away from its initial intention to abolish 
the organization entirely. Crucially, they also illustrate 
the political risks of reform and abolition. When a new 
food scandal developed—horse meat being passed off 
as beef in ready meals—the National Audit Office and 
the chair of the relevant select committee both linked 
the scandal to the 2010 reforms (N.A.O. 2013, 7).
One of the NMD that has been abolished is 
OFLOT—the Office of the National Lottery. OFLOT 
was established to allocate a license to provide a new 
national lottery in the early 1990s, to regulate the lot-
tery when it was established, and to ensure the opera-
tor maximized revenues for charitable causes. The 
National Lottery etc. Act 1993 set up the national 
lottery and established the role of Director-General 
of OFLOT. Dissatisfaction with the way the lottery 
was being run quickly grew. A report by Parliament’s 
Public Accounts Committee (1997) criticized the 
Director-General and was followed in early 1998 by 
a libel case involving two of the competitors for the 
original national lottery license (BBC 1998). The out-
come of the case triggered the resignation of OFLOT’s 
Director-General.7 In April of that year, the Secretary 
of State announced that OFLOT would be replaced 
by the “National Lottery Commission.” The decision 
to terminate OFLOT thus results from specific failings 
of the organization, combined with the arrival of an 
unfriendly majority (a new Labour government) which 
at the time ostensibly favored a nonprofit lottery oper-
ator and was also seeking to strengthen the powers of 
the regulator vis-à-vis the incumbent lottery operator.
Non-Departmental Public Bodies
A NDPB is “a body which has a role in the process of 
national government but [which] is not a government 
department or part of one, and which accordingly 
operates to a greater or lesser extent at arm’s length 
from ministers” (Cabinet Office 2011, 10). There are 
three subtypes of NDPB.
•	 Executive NDPBs have their own legal personality 
and are usually established under the Companies 
Act. They carry out some combination of adminis-
trative, commercial, executive technical, or regula-
tory functions. Examples include the Competition 
Commission, the Arts Council (England), and the 
Medical Research Council
•	 Advisory NDPBs are established to “provide inde-
pendent expert advice to ministers on an ongoing 
basis” (Cabinet Office 2011, 12). They rarely have a 
separate budget and often have limited staff support
•	 Tribunal NDPBs are normally concerned with 
“the rights and obligations of individuals towards 
a branch of government or other public author-
ity” (Cabinet Office 2011, 13). They provide courts 
of appeal for some regulators: for example, the 
Competition Appeals Tribunal acts as an appeal 
body for Competition Commission decisions.
Some of our agencies are not highly salient to the pub-
lic. The Apple and Pear Research Council (APRC) was 
an Executive NDPB established in 19898 to provide 
“near-market research of general benefit to the apple 
and pear industry” based on a levy paid by growers 
(CfAS 2002). The rationale for APRC was primarily 
expertise in this sector of the agricultural market. Two 
factors contributed to the APRC’s demise in 2003. 
One was that the industry shrank over the period. 
The second was a critical review of performance in 
2002 (CfAS 2002). The report recommended that 
the APRC be merged with another Executive NDPB, 
the Horticultural Development Council. Although 
the report uses the phrase “merger,” the process was 
described more accurately in the House of Lords: “to 
transfer the work of the Apple and Pear Research 
Council to the Horticultural Development Council 
by dissolving the Apple and Pear Research Council 
and extending the HDC’s remit to include apples and 
pears.”9 Thus in our data the HDC is coded as surviv-
ing, while the APRC is abolished.
Executive NDPBs are the most diverse group of 
agencies in our data. Ranging from the relatively small 
scale such as the APRC to much larger and salient 
organizations such as the Audit Commission (a regula-
tor of public sector organizations), the National Crime 
Squad, and the Competition Commission (which 
enforces competition law). Not all NDPBs (Executive 
or otherwise) require legislation. The Westminster 
Foundation for Democracy was established under 
Government’s prerogative powers with the aim of 
democracy promotion in emergent democracies. The 
most numerous group in our dataset are the Advisory 
NDPBs. They range from specific areas that require 
technical and independent expertise (Defence Nuclear 
7 Hansard, HC Deb February 04, 1998 vol. 305 cc1049–59.
8 Apple and Pear Research Council Order 1989, available online at http://
www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/1989/2277/contents/made.
9 Hansard, HL Deb March 20, 2003 vol. 646 col 448, emphasis added.
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Safety Committee) to representative groups (Ethnic 
Minority Business Forum) to a body that oversees 
political ethics but without any enforcement powers 
(Committee on Standards in Public Life).
Public Corporations
The final type of body we look at is the public corpo-
ration. These are primarily funded by fees from users 
or other sources. Examples include the broadcaster 
Channel 4 and the Commonwealth Development 
Corporation. In the early part of our period this 
category also included nationalized industries. An 
example of a public corporation is the Independent 
Television Commission (ITC). The Broadcasting Act 
1990 dissolved the previous Cable Authority and the 
Independent Broadcasting Authority and replaced 
them with the ITC. The Commission was responsi-
ble for selling licenses to private sector broadcasters 
and monitoring adherence to standards set out in the 
licenses while simultaneously taking into account plu-
rality of ownership. As part of that role it was responsi-
ble for balancing programming quality criteria against 
price. The chair of the relevant select committee indi-
cated that organizational change was intended to sig-
nal a change in the way regulation would be delivered, 
weakening the role of government and encouraging 
competition and choice: “…it is important that the 
change from the IBA to the ITC should be a water-
shed marking the change from detailed regulation to 
a looser licensing arrangement. The change is now 
clear.”10
The potential clash between political goals and 
independent decision making was illustrated in the first 
year of the ITC’s operation when it chose not to allot 
a license to an incumbent broadcaster. Then Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher wrote to the losing broad-
caster’s chairman: “When I see how some of the other 
licences have been awarded I am mystified that you did 
not receive yours and heartbroken. I am only too pain-
fully aware that I was responsible for the legislation.”11
The Communications Act 2003 replaced the ITC 
with the Office of Communications (Ofcom) which also 
took over the regulatory functions of four other agen-
cies. It might be argued that this does not constitute 
agency termination but as Hardy (2012, 523) writes 
“these regulators reflected different traditions and 
orderings of value, not merely different sectors of 
activity.” The new organization bringing these differ-
ent traditions together could be expected to behave 
very differently from the original organizations even if 
formally the policy to be implemented was unchanged. 
It is likely, therefore, that television broadcasters, 
production companies, and interest groups would take 
the end of the ITC to signal that their previous assump-
tions about the regulator’s behavior were no longer 
sound.
Interpreting British Agencies
The preceding examples help illustrate the contours 
of the notoriously fragmented British delegated state. 
They also illustrate three key points that are important 
for our analysis. First, credibility matters. The FSA was 
formed to address credibility issues and received a stay 
of execution thanks to the need to maintain credibility. 
Second, there are good prima facie reasons to believe 
that partisanship matters. Both the ITC and OFLOT 
were terminated by unfriendly majorities. Third, 
agency termination is distinct from policy termina-
tion. There is, therefore, value in investigating whether 
rationale-based, political and structural features affect 
the risk of agency termination.
These different factors play out within a relatively 
simple political and institutional context. From 1985 
to 2008, Britain was governed by eight different single-
party governments: four Conservative governments led 
by Margaret Thatcher (1983–1987; 1987–1990) and 
John Major (1990–1992; 1992–1997), respectively, 
and four Labour governments led by Tony Blair (1997–
2001; 2001–2005; 2005–2007) and Gordon Brown 
(2007–2010), respectively. During the early part of this 
period, the Labour and Conservative parties disagreed 
over the privatization of nationalized industries, a pol-
icy which required market-enforcing regulation and 
private sector buy-in (Moran 2003). For these reasons, 
Great Britain is an important case in which to test gen-
eral hypotheses about agency termination.
Agency Termination
The Proper Explanandum
The preceding sections have put forward several 
hypotheses concerning agency termination, and the 
specifics of agencies in the United Kingdom. In this sec-
tion, we argue for a particular understanding of agency 
termination as distinct from policy termination and 
which includes terminal events like mergers or replace-
ment, before going on to discuss our data on agency 
termination.
The continuation or demise of specific agencies is a 
subject worthy of study in its own right, distinct from 
the study of policy termination. Over time, agencies 
can develop procedures, cultures, track records, and 
reputations which signal—to both politicians and 
external audiences—that they are robustly independ-
ent of political influence, such that any new agency 
implementing the “same” policy would be subject to 
greater scrutiny on account of having accumulated 
10 Hansard, HC Deb February 8, 1989 vol. 146 col 1026.
11 Hansard, HC Deb October 17, 1991 vol. 196 col 452.
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lower reserves of reputation. There will be a period 
in which the relevant publics reserve their judgments 
about a new agency until it develops its own reputa-
tion. The generation of credibility is about perception 
management and it is built around particular, named, 
agencies with specific track records. As Carpenter and 
Krause (2012, 26)  write: “Organizational reputation 
is defined as a set of beliefs about an organization’s 
capacities, intentions, history, and mission that are 
embedded in a network of multiple audiences.” To 
abolish, merge, rename, or otherwise signal a discon-
tinuity in an organization’s life is to wipe away these 
embedded beliefs and start again. With some agencies 
this may not carry great cost for a government, but 
with others—those that regulate important activities, 
that embody a commitment over time—it is likely to 
be a much more serious consideration.
Our focus, then, is on understanding agency termi-
nation events that may lead relevant publics to reassess 
their beliefs about the character of policy implemen-
tation. This leads to a more encompassing definition 
of termination than some scholars have used. Rolland 
and Roness (2011), for example, propose six differ-
ent termination events (pure termination, termination 
through absorption, termination through exit from the 
public sector, termination due to reorganization, termi-
nation due to merger, and termination due to splits), 
all of which we include under our heading of termina-
tion. We do not attempt, and the focus of our research 
does not require us, to make fine-grained distinctions 
between these different types of termination. The next 
subsection describes how we went about measuring 
termination and other variables.
Data
Information on independent agencies in the United 
Kingdom is not well organized or consistent over time. 
There is no canonical listing of terminated agencies 
equivalent to the listing found in the United States 
Government Manual, used by Lewis (2002) and oth-
ers. In this section we set out how we went about 
identifying the start and end year of our agencies and 
highlight some of the uncertainties in the data.
We use two sources of primary data: the annual 
Cabinet Office publication Public Bodies, which we 
used for information on NDPBs and public corpora-
tions; and the Civil Service Yearbook, which we used 
for information on NMDs. We used these publications 
to create our dependent variable, whether or not an 
agency was terminated in a given year (thus, our unit 
of analysis is the agency–year). Over our time period 
these publications do not consistently list terminations 
in a given year, but do list those agencies which were 
present in a given year. We considered an agency to 
have been terminated in year j if it did not appear in 
the edition of Public Bodies/the Civil Service Yearbook 
for that year and did not appear in the subsequent 
edition either. Cases where an agency did not appear 
in year j, but reappeared in year j+1, were treated as 
scribal errors. Cases where an agency did not appear 
in Public Bodies for two consecutive years, but which 
subsequently reappeared under the same name or a 
similar name, were treated as refoundings.12
The resulting list of potential terminations was 
manually checked. We searched Hansard and Nexis 
in order to find more detailed information on each 
potential termination. Where we could not find data 
relevant to agency termination, we assumed that the 
information contained in Public Bodies was accurate 
and entered the termination year for the agency as the 
first year in which it failed to appear in Public Bodies. 
If we found information relevant to agency termina-
tion which did not match the information implicit in 
Public Bodies, we assumed the information contained 
in Public Bodies was flawed and amended the date of 
termination (or, in some cases, the fact of termination 
itself). In a limited number of cases (agencies with mul-
tiple regional units, only some of which were termi-
nated) we removed entries from our data.
The pattern of agency birth and termination for 
the years 1985–2008 is illustrated in figure  1. Note 
that the terminations columns refer only to agencies 
born in 1985 or later. The median age at termination 
is 10 years, slightly shorter than the equivalent figure 
for US agencies found in Carpenter and Lewis (2004).
Each of the agencies in the data was hand coded 
by the authors in terms of its dominant rationale. 
We used the four categories discussed earlier (regula-
tion, probity, expertise, representation). We refer to 
the dominant rationale because those agencies that 
are regulators often also signal probity and employ 
expertise. Agencies are categorized according to the 
most encompassing rationale. Thus, regulation is more 
encompassing than probity which in turn is more 
encompassing than expertise. We use the fourth ration-
ale—representation—as the baseline category in the 
statistical analyses that follow. The authors coded each 
agency separately. This resulted in a percentage agree-
ment of 76%, and a Krippendorff’s alpha coefficient of 
0.57. The authors subsequently discussed discordant 
codings, revised the coding guidelines, and agreed on 
consensus codings.
In order to measure the political orientation of 
the government in any given year, we use data from 
Hakhverdian (2009), who produces annual measures 
of government policy position on a left-right dimen-
sion through automated content analysis of annual 
12 Our results do not change significantly if these refoundings are treated 
as continuations, or indeed if they are dropped from the data.
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budget speeches. We carry the last value forward to 
2007. Policy positions to the left receive lower scores; 
positions to the right higher scores. We use this value 
to measure policy orientation and also to calculate 
the effects of political turnover, or political distance. 
Political distance is the absolute distance between the 
left-right position of the enacting government and the 
current government.
Information on levels of government debt as a per-
centage of GDP was taken from the HM Treasury 
Public finances databank.13 Table  1 shows summary 
statistics for each of these variables. Continuous varia-
bles were subsequently standardized to have zero mean 
and unit standard deviation (SD) before conducting 
the analysis.
Modeling
Our dependent variable is a duration in years which 
suffers from right-censoring, in that some of the agen-
cies in our data were still alive at the end of our period 
of observation. The proper statistical model for this 
kind of dependent variable is a survival model. Both 
parametric and nonparametric survival models are 
available, and some authors have argued for theoreti-
cally informed parametric distributions concerning 
the underlying hazard function (Carpenter and Lewis 
2004). Since our knowledge of agency survival outside 
of presidential systems is much more limited, we opt 
for a nonparametric Cox proportional hazards regres-
sion. This assumes that agencies share the same under-
lying and unknown hazard rate, which is multiplied by 
the effect of the associated covariates.
This last assumption can be tested by examining 
the Schoenfeld residuals for each independent vari-
able as a function of time (Grambsch and Therneau 
1994). We found that some variables violated the 
proportional hazards assumption. Consequently, the 
models reported include interaction terms between 
public company status and time, between public com-
pany status and time squared, between debt and time, 
and between debt and time squared. What this means 
substantively is that the level of protection (or risk) for 
an agency from a factor changes with the age of an 
agency. In our results section we present these results 
graphically. In certain cases, the predicted hazard rates 
are out-of-sample predictions. Thus, we have very few 
public companies which lasted more than 15  years. 
Consequently, beyond this point predicted hazard rates 
are extrapolations from a narrower timespan.
Table  2 shows the results of this survival model. 
The left-hand column shows the values of the coeffi-
cients and their associated 95% confidence intervals. 
The right-hand column shows the hazard ratio associ-
ated with each coefficient, or the change in the risk of 
termination in a given year associated with a one unit 
increase in the relevant variable, where values greater 
than one indicating an increased risk.
The overall fit of the model, as measured using 
Harrell’s concordance measure,14 is average: at 0.683, 
it is just below the 0.7 rule-of-thumb for use in clini-
cal prognostic models (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000, 
162). The pseudo R2 is low, as is typical for models of 
this kind.
We begin by discussing the effects of different 
rationales. We hypothesized that agencies with ration-
ales other than representation would face a lower risk 
Figure 1. Foundings and terminations over time.
13 Accessed on February 28, 2012.
14 Harrell et al. (1984) explains the concordance measure in the clinical 
context as follows: “the index c estimates the probability that, of two 
randomly chosen patients, the patient with the higher prognostic score 
will outlive the patient with the lower prognostic score. Values of c near 
0.5 indicate that the prognostic score is no better than a coin-flip in 
determining which patient will live longer. Values of near 0 or 1 indicate 
the baseline data virtually always determine which patient has a better 
prognosis.”
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of termination. We find that all of these rationales are 
associated with a statistically significant decrease in 
the risk of termination, confirming Hypothesis 1(a), 
although this effect is only significant at the 5% level 
for agencies having regulation as their rationale. The 
size of the effect is considerable, and greater than any 
of the political/economic factors. Although the size 
of the effect for agencies having regulation as their 
rationale is greater than effect for other rationales, the 
confidence intervals overlap, meaning that we cannot 
confirm Hypothesis 1(b).
We move on to discuss the effects of structure. As 
expected, executive NDPBs/NMDs face a significantly 
lower risk of termination than advisory NDPBs, con-
firming Hypothesis 2. The same is not true of public 
corporations, which exhibit a changing risk profile 
over time. Figure  2 plots the effect, in terms of the 
hazard ratio, of being structured as a public corpora-
tion, over time. Hazard ratios are plotted relative to 
the sample means, except for plotted variables. Public 
companies face a much higher risk for the first to fifth 
years of their life, which corresponds to the aver-
age agency age across all agency–years. For the next 
5 years, they approach the relatively low hazard ratio 
faced by executive NDPBs, but as the agency enters its 
teens, it becomes increasingly likely to be terminated 
(keeping in mind the point made earlier regarding 
extrapolation). This corresponds to a pattern where 
public companies exist either for a short time pending 
the sale of all government shares and complete privati-
zation, or for a longer time due to more fundamental 
restructuring.
We turn finally to the effects of political orientation 
and political turnover. There is no statistically signifi-
cant effect of facing a majority which is ideologically 
distant from the government which established the 
agency—an unfriendly majority, to use the terminology 
of Lewis (2002). Thus, we cannot confirm Hypothesis 
3(b). There is a statistically significant effect of politi-
cal orientation, but the interpretation of this effect is 
complicated by the interaction between political ori-
entation and debt. Figure 3 plots the effect, in terms 
of the hazard ratio, of different government “types,” 
over different levels of debt. Agencies operating under 
a “right-wing” government (understood here as a gov-
ernment which has a policy position equal to the mean 
of our left-right scale plus one SD) face a hazard ratio 
that is higher than the baseline government (under-
stood as a government which has a policy position 
at the mean of our left-right scale), for low to moder-
ately high levels of government debt, for agencies with 
average age.15 After this point, it is agencies operating 
under a left-wing government which face a higher risk 
of termination. This is consistent with Hypothesis 3(a) 
concerning right-wing governments (since the effect on 
termination is positive for the average level of govern-
ment debt), Hypothesis 4(a) concerning the effects of 
debt (since the effect on termination is positive for the 
average government), and our more specific expecta-
tion about the greater sensitivity of left-wing govern-
ments to debt (Hypothesis 4[b]).
The substantive import of our findings can be 
made clearer by contrasting those agencies for which 
we predicted the greatest average risk of termina-
tion over the course of their life with those agen-
cies for which we predicted the lowest such risk. 
The Gangmasters Licensing Authority had one of 
Table 1. Summary Statistics by Agency–Year
Variable N Mean Min Max SD Source
Function: Probity 5,713 22.90% Public Bodies
Function: Regulation 5,713 23.00% Public Bodies
Function: Technical 5,713 40.20% Public Bodies
Function: Representative 5,713 13.80% Public Bodies
Type: Executive NDPB/NMD 5,713 41.60% Public Bodies
Type: Public companies 5,713 3.20% Public Bodies
Type: Tribunal 5,713 7.80% Public Bodies
Type: Advisory 5,713 47.30% Public Bodies
Abs. change in govt. pos’n., L-R 
scale, 1-year lag
5,713 9.17 0 43.3 8.47 Hakhverdian (2009)
Govt. pos’n., L-R scale, 1-year lag 5,713 22.07 9 52.3 10.27 Hakhverdian (2009)
Debt as percentage of GDP, 1-year lag 5,713 35.46 26 52.5 5.03 HM Treasury 
Public Finances 
Databank
Note: For continuous variables, these figures refer to variables before standardization. Coefficients in the survival model use standardized 
variables.
15 This last detail is important, because the effect of debt enters into 
an interaction with time. The effect of greater-than-average debt on 
agency termination is negative for very young agencies, and for older 
agencies, but positive for agencies in their third to seventh years.
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the lowest average predicted risks over the period in 
which it features in our data (2005 onward). It is a 
regulator concerned with the supply of workers in 
three sectors: agriculture, horticulture, and shellfish 
cultivation. It has a low predicted risk of termination 
not just due to its characteristics as an regulator, but 
also to the fact that it was operating under a Labour 
government with (at the time) comparatively low lev-
els of public debt.
Those agencies with the highest lifetime average risk 
include those public companies which were established 
as a result of the process of privatization. The agency 
with the highest average risk is the Eastern Electricity 
Board plc., which was the successor to the long-lived 
Eastern Electricity Board. One of the regional elec-
tricity companies created by the Electricity Act 1989, 
it survived as a public company for 1 year before its 
privatization as Eastern Group, the remains of which 
are now owned by E.On and EDF. The high predicted 
hazard rate of this body is due not only to its status as 
a public company, but also to the period: according to 
our annual left-right positions, the Thatcher govern-
ment between 1988 and 1989 (which enters into our 
model as a lagged predictor for 1990 and 1991) was at 
its most right-wing (with the exception of a brief peak 
before in 1987).
Conclusion
We began this article by discussing the relationship 
between agency survival in parliamentary systems, 
and the specific rationales for which those agencies 
are often created. We raised the possibility that the 
benefits of decision making by independent agencies 
might be undone if governments terminated agencies 
at high rates.
Table 2. Cox Proportional Hazards Model of Agency Termination
Variable Coefficient Hazard Ratio
Function: Probity v. Representation −0.311 0.732 †
(−0.658, 0.035) (0.386, 1.079)
Function: Regulation v. Representation −0.687 0.503 ***
(−1.089, −0.284) (0.101, 0.906)
Function: Technical v. representation −0.277 0.758 †
(−0.557, 0.002) (0.478, 1.037)
Abs. Change in govt. pos’n, L-R scale, 1-year lag 0.001 1.001
(−0.115, 0.116) (0.885, 1.116)
Gov’t. Pos’n, L-R scale, 1-year lag 0.170 1.185 **
(0.059, 0.281) (1.074, 1.296)
Debt (% GDP), 1-year lag −0.291 0.747 *
(−0.555, −0.027) (0.483, 1.011)
Type: Executive NDPB or NMD v. Advisory NDPB −0.609 0.544 ***
(−0.864, −0.354) (0.289, 0.799)
Type: Public company v. Advisory NDPB 2.673 14.481 ***
(1.865, 3.480) (13.673, 15.288)
Type: Tribunal v. Advisory NDPB −0.079 0.924
(-0.604, 0.446) (0.399, 1.449)
Govt. L-R pos’n. × Debt, 1-year lag −0.119 0.888 *
(−0.223, −0.014) (0.784, 0.993)
Public company × time −0.713 0.490 ***
(−1.089, −0.337) (0.114, 0.866)
Public company × time2 0.039 1.04 ***
(0.016, 0.061) (1.017, 1.062)
Debt × time 0.135 1.145 **
(0.038, 0.232) (1.048, 1.242)
Debt × time2 −0.013 0.987 ***
(−0.020, −0.006) (0.98, 0.994)
Log-likelihood 2371.99
Akaike information criterion 4771.99
Pseudo R2 0.028
Concordance 0.683
N (agency–years) 5,713
N (agencies) 723
N (termination events) 420
Note: Two-tailed significance tests: †p< .1; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. (95% confidence intervals in parentheses).
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We have found some evidence that governments in 
one parliamentary democracy take into account the 
rationales of agencies when they consider whether or 
not to terminate them, in that economic regulators—the 
regulators for whom ideas of credible commitment over 
time are most salient—are less likely to be terminated in 
any given year than noneconomic nonregulators.
This effect might have been expected to be stronger 
if our other key hypothesis had been borne out, that is, 
if governments had set about terminating the agencies 
established by previous ideologically distant govern-
ments. The absence of such a finding must cause us to 
reconsider the appropriateness in the United Kingdom 
of certain assumptions about government decisions to 
terminate agencies. It may be that our initial assump-
tion—that governments wish to terminate agencies 
established by previous ideologically distant govern-
ments—was incorrect because governments outside 
of the United States do not in fact “stack the deck” 
when creating these agencies. Or, it may be that one-
party majority governments see themselves as playing 
a repeated game, where decisions to terminate ideo-
logically “unfriendly” agencies will lead to tit-for-tat 
terminations in a later period by governments of a dif-
ferent ideological position (Spiller and Tommasi 2003).
A third possibility is that policy change does not 
predict abolition because agencies respond (enough) 
to ex post political direction to protect themselves. 
Bertelli (2008) has already suggested that arm’s 
length agencies are subject to a form of ex post 
political control, and that this can be seen in the 
way in which agencies’ reporting requirements are 
revised, suggesting that arm’s length agencies should 
be somewhat responsive to the current government’s 
policy position. The ‘somewhat’ is important. The lit-
erature on credibility and the Westminster system has 
often dealt in absolutes, but to the extent that set-
ting up an arm’s length agency increases the political 
cost of reneging on commitments, placing limitations 
on what would otherwise be done, then such agen-
cies do add some credibility, if not complete politi-
cal independence. But if governments can perfectly 
command arm’s length agencies, then terminating 
an agency would serve no purpose for purely policy-
seeking politicians.
Our finding with respect to policy change in govern-
ment runs counter to the expectations of an American 
literature on agency termination. To the limited extent 
that authors have tested for the effects of change in 
policy position on agency termination in parliamen-
tary systems, it also runs counter to that literature. This 
finding is particularly counterintuitive given our expec-
tations surrounding the likely magnitude of this effect 
in Westminster systems. That is, we expected to find a 
Figure 2. Effects of public corporation status over time.
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systematic effect, and we expected it to be big. In reality, 
the effect, if there is one, seems to be close to zero.
It is important to note that we have demonstrated 
this lack of effect without, at the same time, finding 
that agency termination is completely unresponsive 
to the politics of the day. The current position of a 
government on the left-right dimension clearly affects 
the risk of agency termination. Whatever else might 
be responsible for the relative endurance of delega-
tion across contrasting governments, it is not due to a 
complete disconnect between policy position and arm’s 
length administration.
There is, of course, a danger inherent to extrapolat-
ing beyond the period under study. The structures of the 
British regulatory state and other areas of delegated gov-
ernance were built in a political environment that may 
no longer exist. That environment was characterized 
by long periods of single-party majority rule with few 
“close” elections. It seems unlikely that these features 
will hold in the future. The consequences for agency life 
spans are unclear. On the one hand, if periods in gov-
ernment for parties become shorter, the reputation con-
cerns of incumbents will become less powerful. On the 
other hand, if periods in government are shorter, then 
governments have less time to enjoy the policy benefits 
derived from termination. Although we have allowed 
for the shadow of an agency’s (political) past, we are 
far from understanding the shadow cast by expectations 
of future participation in government. Additionally, if 
future governments are coalition governments charac-
terized by a greater number of veto players, the base-
line hazard of agencies may also change. We expect and 
hope that future research testing these hypotheses in the 
context of coalition government in the United Kingdom 
and elsewhere will address some of these issues.
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